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Litigation's Bounded Effectiveness and the Real Public Trust
Doctrine: The Aftermath of the Mono Lake Case*
Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold* *and Leigh A. Jewel**

*

"In the long run, as Los Angeles drinks, the lake shrinks."'
I.

Introduction

Litigation obviously plays a significant role in environmental and natural
resources policy.2 However, the effectiveness of environmental litigation-both as
a means of resolving disputes and as a means of protecting the environment-is
hotly debated.3 Setting aside questions about the legitimacy, fairness, and

*Reprinted with modifications and permission from Beyond Litigation: Case Studies inWater
Rights Disputes (Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold & Leigh A Jewell eds., forthcoming 2001 from the
Environmental Law Institute). ©Environmental Law Institute, 2001, http./Avww.eli.org.
** Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Land Resources, Chapman
University School of Law.
....*Candidate, Juris Doctor, Chapman University School of Law, Class of 2002.
1. Robert Crabbe, As Mono Lake Rises, Its Political Climate Is Slowly Changing, L.A. TIMES

Oct. 26, 1986, at WL 2144113.
2. A. DanTarlock,The Futureof Environmental"Rule of Law"litigation, 17 PACEENvrL. L.REv. 237,
241-47 (2000); see also FREDERICK R. ANDERSON E"AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PRoTECTION: LAWAND POLICY, 3d
ed. 24-25 (3d. ed. 1990); ROBERT L. ASCHMAN ErAL., AN ENVIRONMENTA LAW ANrHOLOGY 153 (1996);

FRANK P. GRAD &JOEL A. MiTz, ENvIRONMENTAL LAW 4th ed. 5-7, 1159-1336 (2000); WILLIAM MURRAY
TABS & LINDAA. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 2d ed. 181-232 (1997).

3. Scholarship discussing the effectiveness of environmental litigation includes Troyen A
Brennan, EnvironmentalTorts, 46 VAND. L.REV. 1(1993); Rosemary O'Leary, The Impact of FederalCourt
Decisions on the Policies and Administrationof the U.S. EnvironmentalProtetionAgency, 41 ADMIN. L.REv. 549
(1989); and Joseph L.Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine inNatural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Interwntion, 68

MICH. L. Rev. 471 (1970) [hereinafter Sax, Public Trust). Scholarship contesting the impact of
environmental litigation includes Grad &Mintz, supra note 2 at 14-16; Jonathan H.Adler, Stand or
De/iwr: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental Protection, 12 DUKE ENvrL.. L. & POLY F. 39 (2001);
Daniel A Farber, Is the Supreme Court Irrelevant? Reetions on the Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 81

MINN. L.REV. 547 (1997); and Richard Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Soveregnty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IowA L. REv. 631 (1986). Professor Tarlock
offers the most insightful and balanced view, highlighting the tremendous impact environmental
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efficiency of litigation and judicial decisions in resolving environmental and
natural resources conflicts, one can easily become overwhelmed with the single
question of environmental litigation's efficacy. For example, parties to
environmental litigation often have conflicts and problems that are much larger
and more multifaceted than the legal issues addressed in litigation. There is a
growing awareness that forms of dispute resolution other than litigation may be
needed to solve the parties' problems and resolve their complex mix of legal and
non-legal conflicts, and that dispute resolution is often only a subset of problem
solving.4 Furthermore, conflicts between parties to environmental litigation often
persist long after the courts have "definitively" resolved the legal issues in the.
case.' In many contexts, litigation may be dispute non-resolution. Both in the
specific conflict in question and in other conflicts over similar environmental and
natural resources issues, a judicial decision may have very little real impact on the
parties' actions or may have only a "shadow" impact. The law in both theory and
doctrine may not be the law in practice
Speculation and grand theorizing about the effectiveness of
environmental litigation adds little to the debate. Instead, empirical evidence is
needed.' Although scholars could undoubtedly design rigorous statistical

litigation had in creating and shaping environmental law, but questioning its continued
effectiveness and environmental law enters its "second generation." Tarlock, supra note 2.
4. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental justice and Land Use
Regulation, 76 DENV. U.L.Rsv. 1(1998) Ihereinafter, Arnold, Environmental justice]; Luke W.Cole,
Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19
EcoLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992); Carol E. Dinkins, Shall We Fight or Will We Finish: Environmental Dispute
Resolution in a Litigious Society, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,398 (1984); Frank P.Grad, Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Environmental Law, 14 COL. J.ENVrL. L. 157 (1989); Ann L. MacNaughton,
Collaborative Problem-Solving in Environmental Dispute Resolution, 11(1) NAT. RES. & ENVr. 3
(Summer 1996); Lawrence Susskind & Alan Weinstein, Towards a Theory of Environmental
Dispute Resolution, 9 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REv. 311 (1980); Tarlock, supra note 2, at 242-43, 254-69.
5. Craig Anthony (Tony) Amold, Litigation as Dispute Non-Resolution: Lessons from Case
Studies in Water Rights Disputes, in BEYOND LITIGATION: CASE STUDIES IN WATER RIGHTS DISPUTES
(Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold & Leigh A. Jewell, eds., forthcoming 2001) [hereinafter, Arnold,
Dispute Non-Resolution 1;Ann E. Carlson, Standing for the Environment, 45 UCLA L. REv. 931, 9981003 (1998); MacNaughton, supra note 4, at 3; Tarlock, supra note 2, at 254-56, 263-69.
6. Arnold, Dispute Non-Resolution, supra note 5.
7. ROBERrC. EWCKsON, ORDERWrHOUrLAw: How NGHBORSSErI1EDsPUIEs 137-55 (1991).
8. Many scholars have called for greater empirical work in legal scholarship. See Id.at
6-8, 137-55; Arnold, Environmental justice, supra note 4, at 88-89; Adeeb Fadil, Citizen Suits Against
Polluters: Picking Up the Pace, 9 HARv. ENVrL. L. Rev. 23, 29-30 (1985); John P. Heinz, Why Study
Law Among the Tiv (orAmong the Los Angelenos)?, 79 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1269 (1985); Craig Allen Nard,

Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue Between the Academy and the Profession, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 347 (1995); Teresa A. Sullivan, Methodological Realities: Social Science Methods and
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studies to test the effectiveness of environmental litigation, such studies would
arguably miss many of the nuances of the ways in which environmental
litigation is effective, ineffective, and partially effective. Instead, case studiesqualitative empirical research--offer the rich details and complex interplay of
factors needed to shape our understanding of environmental and natural
resources litigation, even if case studies do not "prove" a thesis.9 We have
chosen to examine the effectiveness of environmental litigation by conducting a
study of one of the most famous environmental cases of the twentieth century,
involving judicially imposed common law constraints on natural resources
exploitation to protect the environment: National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court.' o The case involved a conflict over Mono Lake, an unusual and
ecologically valuable lake in Northern California, which was experiencing
dropping lake levels and the resulting environmental harm due to more than
forty years of diversions of water by Los Angeles for its water supply. The case
pitted a powerful, growing urban area, protecting its long-standing, wellrecognized rights to appropriate water from Mono Lake's feeder streams, against
determined, creative environmentalists, Who argued the public trust doctrine
prevents the recognition of water rights that result in environmental harm.
Public trust is a common law doctrine that limits the power of state
legislatures and their administrative agencies from conveying land owned by the
state lying under navigable waters to private parties." As a general rule, the
states own the land under water present within its borders so long as the body
of water meets the federal test of navigability. 2 In The Daniel Ball, the United
States Supreme Court articulated the federal test for navigability:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are
navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or
are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways
for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in
the customary modes of trade and travel on water.'3

Business Reorganizations,72 WASH. U.L.Q. 1291 (1994); Lee E. Teitelbaum, An Overview of Law and
Social Research, 35 1. LEG. ED. 465 (1985).
9. The works cited in note 8, supra, generally discuss both quantitative and qualitative
empirical research and their comparative advantages and disadvantages. For further comparisons
and research design methods, see JOHN W. CR swELL, RESEARCH DESIGN: QUAUmvE AND OUANTrAIVE
APPROACHES (1994); MICHAEL QUINN PATTON, QUALrAnVE EVALUAnON AND RESEAR-r MEnHODs, (2d ed.
1990); RoBERT K.YIN, CASE S'uDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS, (2d ed. 1994).
10.

658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).

11. JOSEPH L.SAxErAL., LEGAL CONTROLOF WATER RESOURCES 529(3rd ed. 2000) hereinafter
SAx ErAL., WATER RESOuRcES]. Joseph Sax wrote the seminal work on the application of the public
trust doctrine to natural resources law. See Sax, PublicTrust, supra note 3.
12.

See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971).

13.

The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557,563 (1870).
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Lands under waters that meet the test for navigability must be held in
trust for the public. In other words, they belong to the people of the state or, at a
minimum, are conditioned on an easement for public purposes such as
navigation, travel, fishing, and recreation.'
The public trust responsibility is out of the reach of any legislative body to
change and "Itlhe sovereign power itself... cannot, consistently with the laws of
nature and the constitution of a well ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant
of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right."" Califomia
has long recognized the public trust, and for nearly 100 years has statutorily provided
that the waters of the state are owned by the people of California. 7
On its face, the public trust doctrine seems at odds with the Califomia system of
appropriative water rights. At one end of the spectrum, the public trust doctrine
facilitates preservation of public resources and promotes environmental values and
the public interest over private control. In particular, the public trust doctrine favors
instream uses of water. At the other end of the spectrum, sometimes referred to as the
inverse of the public trust, 8 the appropriative rights system rejects public water rights
in favor of development and consumption of water by private parties, as the greatest
good flows from private consumption.' 9 Essentially, the prior appropriation system
endorses diverting water from its natural course so long as private parties put such
diversions to beneficial use.2"
The California Supreme Court finally resolved the inevitable legal clash
between these two systems in its 1983 decision in National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court.2 I n what has been considered by some experts to be among the
top ten most important American environmental law decisions,22 the California
Supreme Court did not choose one system over the other. Instead, the Court
declared that the water law of California integrates both the public trust doctrine
and the appropriative rights system and placed a substantive obligation on the
State Water Resources Control Board to consider the impact of appropriation
rights on public trust uses before allowing diversions and in reviewing diversions

14.

ofthe Public Trust, 25 EcOLOGY LQ.351,351 (1998).
See Carol M. Rose, losh Sax and he idea

15.

Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.I.L. 1,78(1821).

16.

CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971).

17. Cynthia L. Koehler, Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Resolution of the Mono Lake
Controversy, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 541, 546 (1995) (citing People v.Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4
P 1152, 1159 (Cal. 1884)).
18.

Id.at 552.

19.

Id.

20.

Id.

21.

Nat'l Audubon, 658 P.2d 709.

22. Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in
Western Water, 37 AJZ.L. REv. 701,703 (1995).
1180
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allowed without proper consideration of public trust values.23 Conceiving of its
integration of the two doctrines as requiring that the Board to balance them, the
Court did not establish any specific allocation of water for the Mono Basin, leaving
the task for the State Water Resources Control Board.24
The significance of the California Supreme Court not choosing one system
over the other cannot be understated. If the Court had chosen only the public
trust system, protecting ecological and aesthetic uses of Mono Lake,25
diversions supplying Los Angeles residents with water certainly would have
been curtailed. Furthermore, settled expectations for long-standing water rights
would have been thrown into chaos. Curtailment of the diversions still would
have left Los Angeles with a need to find replacement water, potentially
damaging other water resources with in the State, and left all water
appropriators statewide in a state of uncertainty over their rights. If, instead, the
Court had held that public trust uses did not have to be considered, and only
the appropriative rights system applied, damage to Mono Lake and other water
resources in California would have continued. The public's interest in navigable
waters would have meant little if appropriators could completely consume
bodies of water for out-of-stream uses.
The Court set the stage for development of "the real public trust doctrine":
the public trust doctrine in practice outside of judicial forums. The survival of
the Mono Lake ecosystem required a judicial determination that the public trust
doctrine limits (at least partially) prior appropriation water rights. However, no
single court opinion-regardless of its legal landmark status-would ensure the
viability and impact of public trust principles for Mono Lake or for other water
systems in California. The public trust doctrine has taken on substantial
meaning and value in the parties' post-decision actions. Environmentalists'
persistent litigation, negotiation with the Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power, education of the public, and creative problem-solving, as well as the
cooperative responses of Los Angeles, has led to an effective resolution of the
issue, or more broadly, an effective public trust doctrine. This resolution
includes substantially reduced diversions of water from the Mono Basin,
increased health of Mono Lake, and sufficient water supplies to support the
rapidly growing Los Angeles metropolis without draining other water basins.
Part I of this case study discusses how the conflict between environmentalists
and Los Angeles arose, and failed pre-litigation attempts at resolving the conflict. Part
11describes the National Audubon litigation and the Califomia Supreme Court's decision
in the case. Part II explicates the aftermath of National Audubon, including
subsequent litigation under the Califomia Fish and Game Code, environmental

23.

Nat'l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 712.

24.

id.at 732.

25.

There are two excellent Intemet resources on Mono Lake's natural, political, and
legal
history
and
characteristics,
available at
http//www.monolake.org
&
httplJ/www.monobasinresearch.org.
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activism and public education, negotiation, State Water Resources Control Board
decision making, and ultimate agreement. This agreement resolved the conflict with a
combination of reduced diversions from the Mono Lake tributaries and publicly
funded reclamation and conservation programs.
Part IV of this case study contends that environmental litigation, such as
public trust litigation, is characterized by "bounded effectiveness." Both litigation
and judicial decisions applying the public trust doctrine to uses of natural
resources are necessary but not sufficient to effectuate the values of the public
trust. The "real" public trust doctrine exists in the aftermath of litigation: the
parties' post-litigation actions that either resolve or do not resolve legal conflicts.
11.

Pre-Utgation Background
A.

Mono Lake

One of North America's oldest bodies of water, Mono Lake was formed a million
years ago in a volcanic area, and is most widely known for its high salinity and
limestone formations that resemble cactus along its shoreline. 6 Located
approximately 190 miles east of San Francisco and 300 miles north of Los Angeles,"
the lake sits near the eastem entrance to Yosemite National Park and is the second
largest lake in Califomia.28 Most of Mono Lake's water supply has come from the Sierra
Nevada snowmelt, although the lake receives some water from precipitation on its
surface. 9 The runoff from the snowmelt is carried to the west end of the lake via five
freshwater streams: Mill, Lee Vining, Walker, Parker, and Rush Creeks.3"
Mono Lake is considered a terminal lake because surface runoff and
groundwater seepage end in the lake, resulting in the high salinity.3 ' Mono Lake
does not have fish due to its high salinity. However, it does sustain a sizeable
population of brine shrimp.32 The shrimp population feeds a large number of
nesting and migratory birds, making preservation of the population in the lake
extremely important to species in various migration routes.33 In addition, the
lake has natural islands that serve as protective habitat for a considerable
breeding colony of California gulls because the water between the mainland and

26. Steve Lawrence, Environmentalists Campaigning for Shrinking Mono Lake, THE
ASS c[ATED PRESS, Sep. 27, 1985, at WL 2876983.
27.

Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 704. Nat'l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 711.

28.

Nat'l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 711.

29.

Id.

30.

Id.

31.

Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 22.

32.

Nat'l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 711.

33.

Id.
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the island prevents predators such as coyotes from reaching the young.34 Finally,
the unique scenery of towers and spires on the shores, which Ansel Adams
depicted in his famous photographs, make Mono Lake a tourist attraction."
B.

The Diversions

In 1940, the Division of Water Resources,36 which was the predecessor to the
State Water Rights Board and ultimately the State Water Resources Control Board
(hereinafter 'Water Board"), granted the City of Los Angeles Department of Water
and Power (hereinafter "DWP") a permit to appropriate almost the complete flow of
four of the five streams that supply water into Mono Lake.37 Immediately after
receiving appropriative rights to the four streams, DWP erected structures to divert
approximately half of the flow of the four streams into DWP's Owens Valley
aqueduct.38 Then, in 1970, DWP constructed another diversion tunnel, resulting in
the diversion of almost all of the flow of the four streams.39
The diversions resulted in widespread negative impacts in and around the
lake. The level of the lake dropped and the surface area of the lake went down by

34.

Id.

35.

Id.

36.

The California agency with authority to grant appropriative rights has gone

through various name changes since its inception in 1913. Id; see aLso ARTHUR L. Li~rLEWORTH
& ERIC L. GARNER, CALIFORNLA WATER 113 (1995). Therefore, regardless of the specific name
given to the agency at any given time, "water Board" shall be used hereinafter to refer to the
California agency with authority to grant such rights.
37.

Nat'l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 711.

38. Id. DWP is responsible for the water supply for the City of Los Angeles. DWP
recognized early in the twentieth century that the city's needs would quickly surpass that
which was available from local resources. Id. at 713. Thus, the city erected the Owens Valley
aqueduct in 1913 to transport water 233 miles from the Owens River, through the AntelopeMojave plateau, to the city. Id. Because Los Angeles expanded so quickly, the Owens River
supply was strained, requiring DWP to locate another source. Id. The natural choice was the
Mono Basin due to its proximity to the Owens River, allowing use of the aqueduct
infrastructure already in existence, a very cost-effective way for the city to obtain water. Id.
According to Duane Buccholz, the district engineer at the Bishop office of the Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power in 1986, Mono Lake water is some of the cleanest and
cheapest water in the state because the cost of the hundreds of miles of aqueducts were
paid for years ago and it does not require the expensive process of pumping the water over
mountain ranges. Crabbe, supra note 1. To this end, DWP purchased the riparian rights for
Lee Vining, Walker, Parker, and Rush Creeks, in addition to those for Mono Lake. Nat'l
Audubon, 658 P.2d at 713. Once these purchases were complete, Los Angeles applied to the
Water Board for appropriative rights permits for the four streams in 1940. Id.
39.

Nat'l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 711.
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one-third.4" In fact, between 1940 and 1970, Los Angeles diverted an average of
57,067 acre-feet4 of water per year from the Mono Basin, resulting in the lake
level dropping by an average of 1.1 feet per year.42 In addition to the physical
effects on the lake, the chemical composition increased significantly in salinity. 3
The California gull became particularly endangered by the decrease in lake
level. Ninety-five percent of the state's California gulls and twenty-five percent of
all of the California gulls in existence nested at. Mono Lake according to the
1979 California Department of Water Resources and United States Department
of the Interior joint study Task Force Report.44 Additionally, one of two main
islands that protect bird breeding grounds joined with the mainland because of
the lake level drop, allowing predators access to the nesting grounds. 4, Coyotes
actually reached one of the popular breeding islands by 1979, immediately
resulting in a significant decline in breeding nests.46 Significantly, in 1981,
almost all of the infant birds did not survive to adulthood.47
By the time the parties reached litigation, the predicted, continued effects
of the diversions were hotly contested. However, it seemed apparent that
aesthetic and ecological assets of the lake were in danger. 8
C.

The Water Board's Decision of 1940

Following Los Angeles' application for appropriative rights permits in

1940, the Water Board held hearings at which interested parties asserted their
belief that the appropriations would lower the surface level and harm various
commercial and recreational uses of Mono Lake. 49 The principal authority by

40.

Id.
at 711.

41. An acre-foot is the amount of water required to cover one acre of land one foot of
water in depth. Crabbe, supra note 1.An acre-foot is approximately the amount used by five
people living in a single-family home (with a small garden) in one year. Id.
42. Nat'l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 714. Between 1970 and 1980, following construction of
a second aqueduct to increase flow by 50%, Los Angeles diverted 99,580 on average per year
from the Mono Basin. id.Over the 40-year span from 1940 to 1980, the diversions caused
Mono Lake to shrink from an area of 85 square miles to 60.3 square miles and its surface
level dropped from 6,416 feet above sea level to 6,376 feet above sea level. Id.Exceedingly
wet winters from 1982-1984 gave the lake a moment to rejuvenate, raising the lake level to
6,379 feet above sea level, still 38 feet lower than in 1941. Lawrence, supra note 26.
43.

Nat'l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 716.

44.

Id.at 714, 716.

45.

id..

46.

Idat716.

47.

Id.

48.

Id.at 714.

49.

Id.at 713.
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which the Water Board could deny Los Angeles' permit application was a 1921
amendment to the Water Commission Act of 1913, allowing the Water Board to
deny a permit "when in its judgment the proposed appropriation would not best
conserve the public interest."'" The 1921 amendment also "declared to be the
established policy of this state that the use of water for domestic purposes is
the highest use of water."" The Water Board was to be directed by this policy
that domestic purposes was the most important use of water. 2
Because DWP wanted to divert the water for domestic purposes-for use
by the population of Los Angeles-the Water Board granted the application.
The Water Board believed it had no choice under the 1921 amendment,
regardless of the damage to the public trust uses of Mono Lake. 3 The Water
Board made note of its belief that it had no choice under the law in its decision:
It is indeed unfortunate that the City's proposed development will result in
decreasing the aesthetic advantages of Mono Basin but there is apparently
nothing that this office can do to prevent it. The use to which the City
proposes to put the water under its Applications is defined by the Water
Commission Act as the highest to which water may be applied and to
make available unappropriated water for this use the City has... acquired
the littoral and riparian rights on Mono Lake and its tributaries south of
Mill Creek This office therefore has no alternative but to dismiss all
protests based upon the possible lowering of the water level in Mono Lake
and the effect the diversion of water from these streams may have upon
the aesthetic and recreational value of the Basin. 4
The Water Board was mistaken in its belief. In theory, the Board could
have denied Los Angeles' application on the basis of the previously discussed
provision of the California Constitution. In National Audubon, the California
Supreme Court noted that the Board could have declared the feeder streams
were already put to beneficial use or that DWP suggested an unreasonable use
of the water, violating Article X, § 2 of the California Constitution."

50. Id.(citing Stats. 1921, ch. 329,1, p. 443 (codified as CAL. WATER CODE § 1255 (West 1971)).
The California Supreme Court notes that this was not the only basis upon which the Water Board
could have rejected Los Angeles' permit application: it could have done so on the theory that the
stream waters were already had a beneficial use or that DWP's proposal made an unreasonable use
of water, violating artide X,section 2 of the California Constitution. Nat'l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 714.
Unfortunately, a bitter battle transpired for over half a century because the Water Board did not
consider either of these theories upon which the permit could have been denied.
51.

CAL. WATERCODE§ 1254 (West 1971).

52.

Id.

53.

Nat'l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 713-14.

54.

Division Water Resources Decision 7053, 7055,8042 &8043, at 26 (Apr. 1I, 1940).

55. -658 P.2d at 714.
1185
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The Water Board failed to reach a decision in the 1940s that could have
avoided both continued harm to Mono Lake's ecosystem and continued conflict
between Los Angeles and environmentalists, which ultimately led to litigation.
By the time the National Audubon litigation began, the Water Board had known
for approximately forty years that the diversions would damage the aesthetic,
ecological, and recreational values of Mono Lake.
D.

United States Supreme Court Decision In Arizona v.
California (1963)

The United States Supreme Court ruled in Arizona v. Caifornia that Arizona and
Nevada were entitled to three million acre feet of water from the Colorado River, a
significant source of water for California.56 In 1964, the Supreme Court limited
California's allocations," requiring Califomia to resort to other sources of water.5" This
decision led to the increased diversion from the Mono Lake feeder streams in 1969, as
DWP, California's largest water user, increased its diversion to over 20,000 acre-feet per
year. 9 This new diversion amount represented approximately seventeen percent of
Los Angeles' water supply. ° ,By1979, the Mono Lake feeder streams supplied almost
twenty percent of Los Angeles' water.6'
As a result of increased diversions from the Mono Basin following
the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. California,the level of Mono Lake dropped
rapidly.62 The increased diversions, making up for the loss of water from the
Colorado River, resulted in exposure of the land bridge, which caught the
attention of environmentalists.
E.

The Mono Lake Committee and Environmental Activism

Environmentalists' concern for Mono Lake ultimately resulted in "Save
Mono Lake," a public education campaign, which generated thousands of
bumper stickers and an unexpected "rise of the environmental ethic and the
force with which that ethic would be brought to bear."63 However, the
campaign's enthusiasm and informed concern for Mono Lake began with a
small group of scientists and environmentalists who became alarmed about the
health of the lake and its ecosystem in the 1970s.

56.

Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. 546, 565 (1963).

57.

Ariz. v. Cal., 376 U.S. 340 (1964).

58.

Blumm &Schwartz, supra note 22, at 705.

59.

Id.
at 705-06.

60.

Id.at 705.

61 .S

Brian E.Gray, The Modr Era inCa!bmiaWaterLaw,45 HAsms LI. 249,263 (1994).

62.

Blumm &Schwartz, supra note 22, at 706.

63.

Koehler, supra note 17, at 564.
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David Gaines, a Stanford-educated biologist, ornithologist, and ecologist
spent a year doing research at Mono Lake in 1975 in conjunction with his
teaching job at the University of California at Davis. 64 In 1976 he quit his Davis
teaching job and spent the next two years traveling throughout California,
lecturing to Sierra Club and National Audubon Society chapters to stir interest
in the damage done by Los Angeles to the lake that he loved.6
In 1978, Gaines and his wife founded the Mono Lake Committee with a
small group of people that were also passionate about the lake.6' They set up
Committee headquarters in the small tourist town of Lee Vining, on the eastern
entrance to Yosemite National Park and western shore of Mono Lake.6' They
sold T-shirts and distributed bumper stickers to residents of cities throughout
the State, saying "Save Mono Lake."'6 Gaines was pivotal in bringing together
lawsuit and creating
various environmental groups to file the National Audubon
69
national recognition of the Los Angeles diversions.
F.

Failed Proposals

Prior to filing the NationalAudubon lawsuit, the Mono Lake Committee proposed a
wet year/dry year solution, allowing Los Angeles diversions during dry years, but
prohibiting diversions in wet years when Los Angeles could obtain water from other
sources.7" This proposal likely failed for two reasons. First, there were few scientific
studies to support the environmentalists' belief that further diversions would irreparably
damage Mono Lake. Much of what the environmentalists' suggested was considered
conjecture. Second, the Water Board's decision in the 1940s left DWP with the
impression that public interest groups could not challenge Los Angeles' water rights.
The Mono Lake Committee and other environmental groups' activism also
initiated creation of a State task force.7 ' In 1979, the task force issued a scheme
for preserving the Mono Basin natural resources.72 However, Los Angeles did
not implement the task force's plan, blaming high costs.73 Failure of this plan
directly led to filing the National Audubon litigation.
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!11. The Mono Lake Litigation and Landmark Decision
A.

Litigation

In 1979, the National Audubon Society, the Mono Lake Committee, and
other environmentalists who observed the negative impacts, particularly the
rapid decline in the level of Mono Lake, filed suit in Superior Court. They sought
to enjoin diversions by DWP on the theory that the public trust doctrine
protected the shores, bed, and waters of Mono Lake.74 DWP filed a motion for
change of venue that was granted, transferring the case to Alpine County.7
In January 1980, DWP filed a cross complaint against over one hundred
parties claiming water rights in the Mono Basin.76 The United States, one of the
cross defendants, removed the case to the United States District Court for the
7
Eastern District of California in February 1980.1
Under the doctrine of federal abstention,8 the federal district court stayed
its proceeding, and asked the California Superior Court to resolve two issues:
whether there was a conflict between the appropriative water rights system and
the public trust doctrine, and whether the plaintiffs had to exhaust their
administrative remedies with the Water Board before filing suit in court.79
Responding to the federal court's abstention order, the plaintiff
environmentalists filed a complaint for declaratory relief in the Superior Court of
Alpine County. 80 In November 1981, the Superior Court entered summary
judgment in favor of defendants on both issues, finding that the public trust
doctrine did not provide a basis for plaintiffs to challenge the diversions and
that they did not exhaust the required administrative remedies.8'
On the issue of the relationship between the public trust and appropriative
water rights systems, the Superior Court found that the public trust is not a system
that functions independently of the appropriative water rights system."2 Further, the
Superior Court found that "as regards the right of the City of Los Angeles to divert
waters in the Mono Basin that the Public Trust Doctrine is subsumed in the water
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rights system of the state. "83 As for the exhaustion of administrative remedies,
plaintiffs needed to challenge the Mono Lake diversions under a public trust claim
before the Water Board or a claim that the appropriated water was being put to an
unreasonable or non-beneficial use.8
Plaintiffs petitioned the California Supreme Court for a writ of mandate to
review the Superior Court's decision.85 The California Supreme Court agreed to review
the Superior Court's decision because of the significance of the issues at stake.'
B.

The California Supreme Court Decision in National Audubon
Society v. Superior Court
1.

Applicability of the Public Trust Doctrine to Prior
Appropriation Water Rights

The California Supreme Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate
ordering the Superior Court to vacate its judgment and enter a new judgment
consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion.87 The Court stated that the "core
of the public trust doctrine is the state's authority as sovereign to exercise a
continuous supervision and control over the navigable waters of the state and
the lands underlying those waters."' According to the Court, the State's
sovereign authority applies to the Mono Lake feeder streams and prohibits an
entity such as DWP or others from obtaining vested rights where it is evident
that interests protected by public trust are harmed by the diversions. 89
In Marks v. Whitney, the California Supreme Court applied the public trust
doctrine to tideland and lakeshore waters, and determined that the public trust
protections include ecological and recreational values, not merely commercial
and transportation needs.90 The National Audubon Court adapted the Marks v.
Whitney holding to flowing bodies of water.9' The public trust doctrine therefore
protects the environmental values and ecologically vital instream uses of waters
subject to diversion. Furthermore, the National Audubon Court held that the
public trust doctrine applies to non-navigable waters, particularly Mono Lake's
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feeder streams that are non-navigable, to the extent that appropriations of nonnavigable waters harm navigable waters, in this case Mono Lake itself.92
The California Supreme Court noted that the realities of California are such that
the State must have the power to allow water to be diverted; the diversions are
necessary to the State's success and the ability of people to live in a state with
widespread areas characterized by desert climate.93 Therefore, the Court said that the
State must have the power to grant appropriated water rights even where public trust
uses may be harmed.94 However, these rights must be non-vested rights.95 In addition,
just because the rights can be granted does not mean that they may be granted
without first considering the negative impacts on the public trust uses.96 In the instant
case, the Water Board had declined to consider the public trust impacts of DWP's
water diversions when approving DWP's appropriative rights.97
Because the Court believed lack of any such consideration could result in
wasteful damage to the public trust uses, the Court stated "we believe that before the
state courts and agencies approve water diversions they should consider the effect of
such diversions upon interests protected by the public trust, and attempt, so far as
feasible, to avoid or minimize any harm to those interests."9 Thus, because no such
consideration occurred, the Court required a study of the Mono Basin water rights and
an assessment of the potential and means to integrate the public trust doctrine and
the appropriative rights system.9
2.

The State's Powers and Duties as Trustee

To arrive at its conclusion that at the heart of the public trust doctrine is the
State's authority as sovereign to supervise and manage its navigable waters, the
National Audubon Court traced the history of public trust powers in Califomia.'0° The
Court began by pointing out that in its review of public trust law, the "dominant theme
is the state's sovereign power and duty to exercise continued supervision over the
trust." '° As a result, any parties who acquire rights in public trust property may not
obtain a vested right and acquire the property subject to the public trust.'0 2
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Several significant cases set the doctrinal foundation for the National
Audubon Court's extension of the public trust doctrine to the appropriative water
rights system. The United States Supreme Court decision in Illinois Central
03
Railroad Company v. Illinois"
continues to be the principal authority for public
trust law, recently acknowledged as such by the California Supreme Court in City
of Berkeley v. Superior Court.'0 4 In 1886, the Illinois Legislature granted the railroad
almost the entire Lake Michigan waterfront in Chicago-i,000 acres of lands
under water in fee simple. '05 The Illinois Legislature desired to revoke the grant
legislatively a few years later.'" The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this revocation
on the basis that the lands under waters, which may be conveyed to private
individuals to construct docks and other structures that further public trust
purposes could be granted without being subject to the trust, but not all of the
land could be so conveyed, as was done here. 07 The problem with such a
conveyance was that it would prohibit any future legislatures from defending the
public's interests.' 8 The Supreme Court declared:
A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a State has
never been adjudged to be within the legislative power; and any
attempted grant of the kind would be held, if not absolutely void on
its face, as subject to revocation. The State can no more abdicate its
trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like
navigable waters and soils under them .. .than it can abdicate its
police powers in the administration of government and the
preservation of the peace. In the administration of government the
use of such powers may for a limited period be delegated to a
municipality or other body, but there always remains with the State
the right to revoke those powers and exercise them in a more direct
manner, and one more conformable to its wishes. So with trusts
connected with public property, or property of a special character,
like lands under navigable waterways, they cannot be placed entirely
beyond the direction and control of the State.' 9
Thus, any grant of virtually all of the public trust lands related to a
waterway is by its nature revocable by the State at any time." 0
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Although the grant is revocable by the state at any time, expenses that may have
been incurred related to the improvements should be paid for by the state." '
Nonetheless, land held in public trust may not be disposed of by the legislature except
in cases where such grant actually improves the public interest in the parcel or where
such is done without detriment to the lands subject to the trust." 2
In 1913, the California Supreme Court first applied the Illinois Centraldecision in
People v. California Fish Company."3 In California Fish, under statutory authority, state
commissioners granted title to approximately 80,000 acres of tidelands to private
owners. The California Supreme Court enunciated that courts will carefully scrutinize
a statute conveying public trust property to the point where the conveyance equates
to an abandonment of the property; the court will determine if the abandonment
was the legislature's intent.' 4 The intent must be express or a necessarily inferred
from the language of the statute." 5' If any reading of the statute does not harm or
destroy a public trust interest, the statute should be given the non-destructive
interpretation by the courts." 6
Once the California Supreme Court applied these guiding principles, it
determined that the grant was not made for purposes that benefited the public
trust interests, and therefore, the recipients did not own absolute title to the
property."' The property was subject to easements for navigation and commerce
by the public. In addition the state possessed to come on to the property and
make any improvements the State deemed necessary for the advancement of the
public good. '" Therefore, the State did not reacquire the property; instead, the
grantees retained the property subject to the public trust."'
In Boone v. Kingsbury,"2 decided in 1928, the California Supreme Court had
further occasion to apply the public trust doctrine. The California Legislature had
given power to the Surveyor-General to lease public trust lands to drill for oil.'2'
Applying guidance provided in Illinois Central, the California Supreme Court sustained
the statute on the basis that the drilling derricks would not significantly impede the
public trust.' 22 However, any licenses granted under the statute continued to be
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subject to the trust, including the right of the State to remove the structures at any
time upon finding of substantial interference with the trust.23
Finally, in City of Berkeley v. Superior Court,'24 the California Supreme Court
considered whether Board of Tidelands deeds, executed under authorization by an
1870 act, transferred title free of the public trust.'2' Again, applying guidance from the
previous cases, the Court held the grantees' title nevertheless remained subject to the
public trust.2 6 The Court's reasoning was two-fold: first the Legislature did not clearly
articulate its intention to permit conveyances free of the public trust, and 2second,
the
7
1870 act and the conveyances pursuant to it did not further trust purposes.'
The National Audubon Court summarized all of the previous cases to
indicate the enduring power of the State as manager of the public trust.'28 The
power even reaches to allow withdrawal of previously granted rights or the use
of the trust on lands believed unencumbered by the trust.'29 The public trust is
"more than an affirmation of state power to use public property for public
purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people's
common heritage of streams, land] lakes . . . surrendering that right of
protection ...only when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the
purposes of the trust."'30 Thus, the public trust doctrine was well established in
California when the Mono Lake litigation made its way to the courts.
3.

The California Water Rights System: Limiting and
Regulating Usufructuary Interests

Following its discussion of the history of public trust in California, the
Supreme Court proceeded to a discussion of the California water rights system.
The Court first noted that California cases do not speak of water ownership;
instead, they speak only of the right to use water."' Likewise, Water Code §
102 32 states, "[aill water within the State is the property of the people of the
State, but the right to the use of water may be acquired by appropriation in the
manner provided by law."' 33 In other words, property rights in water
appropriations are usufructuary, not possessory, interests.
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A significant defining feature of appropriation rights in National Audubon was
the California Constitution provision that declares the water policy for the State:
It is hereby declared that because of the conditions prevailing in this State
the general welfare requires that the water resources of the State be put to
beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the
waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water be
prevented, and that the conservation of such waters is to be exercised with
a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the
people and for the public welfare. The right to water or to the use or flow of
water in or from any natural stream or water course in this State is and
shall be limited to such ,water as shall be reasonably required for the
beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not extend to
the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or
unreasonable method of diversion of water.'34 Therefore, all uses of water
are inherently limited by a standard of reasonable use. 3 '
The constitutional amendment did not enlarge Water Board's authority.
Statutes and case law, however, expanded the Water Board's power gradually
over time to watch over the reasonable use of water. 3 ' In 1955, the Legislature
stated that the Water Board was to consider the benefits to be derived from
beneficial uses of water including instream uses like the preservation of fish and
wildlife and recreational uses.'37 The.Water Board was further authorized by the
Legislature to make appropriations conditioned upon requirements that best
serve the public interest. 3 ' Subsequent Water Code provisions similarly made
reference to the public interest and the Water Board's authorization to take the
public interest in consideration.' 39
Case law likewise expanded the Water Board's powers. One of the
expanded powers included the power to enjoin diversions by the owner of a
prescriptive right who would not comply with conservation programs.4' Another
case declared the power of the Water Board to grant an appropriation
application a quasi-judicial act.' 4 ' Thus, implicitly by the California
Constitution's limits on water rights, and explicitly by legal standards advanced
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by statutes and case law, the Water Board has obtained the duty to
comprehensively plan and allocate the State's waters. 42 The California Supreme
Court stated that this progression affects the Water Board's public trust
responsibilities.'43 The Water Board has the power and function to balance
public trust principles with appropriative rights, and to effectuate the public
trust doctrine's values by regulating water rights.
4.

Integration of the Two Systems

The public trust and appropriative rights systems each developed
separately from the other with their own set of rules. The California Supreme
Court declared itself unable to choose either position that subscribed to only
one system or the other.' 44 The Court stated "[iln our opinion, both the public
trust doctrine and the water rights system embody important precepts which
make the law more responsive to the diverse needs and interests involved in the
planning and allocation of water resources. To embrace one4 system of thought
and reject the other would lead to an unbalanced structure.",1 1
With these perspectives as a foundation, the Court reached three
conclusions. First, the State as sovereign must manage its navigable waters and
the lands lying underneath. 46 Second, reality dictates that the Legislature or an
authorized administrative body must have the power to grant licenses that allow
an appropriator to use water even though such use may harm public trust
"
uses. 47
' Third, the power to grant such licenses is conditioned on the positive
duty of the State to consider the public trust in planning and allocation of water
resources and to protect public trust uses whenever possible. 48 In National
Audubon, the Court ruled that the State-and more specifically, the Water
Board-had not fulfilled its obligation contained in the Supreme Court's third
conclusion: the duty of the State to consider the public trust in water allocation.
Therefore, the Court declared the California system of water rights an
integration of both the public trust doctrine and appropriative rights.'4 9 The
Court stated that the plaintiffs could rely upon the public trust doctrine to
request re-evaluation of the Mono Basin allocations."'
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5.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies With the Water Board

The California Supreme Court next considered the second issue
presented: whether the environmental plaintiffs were required first to exhaust
their administrative remedies with the Water Board before seeking relief in
court. 5' The Court acknowledged the experience and proficiency of the Water
Board for appropriative rights and public trust use issues, supporting a grant of
primary jurisdiction to the Water Board. 2 However, the Court also noted that
under California precedent, the courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the
Water Board for water rights disputes.'
Furthermore, the California Legislature acknowledged such concurrent
jurisdiction by implication by creating a system where the courts can ask the
Water Board to act as referee of water rights controversies." 4 Because of this
procedural grant by the Legislature, the National Audubon Court held that courts
may carry on using their concurrent jurisdiction. However, they should also not
hesitate to ask the Water Board to referee cases where their particular
knowledge would be especially helpful in resolving the conflict." '
Because the courts and the Water Board possessed concurrent
jurisdiction over the matter, the Court did not require the plaintiffs to exhaust
their administrative remedies."' However, the key to the eventual success of the
public trust doctrine and its use by environmentalists to reduce diversions from
the Mono Basin lies in the final words of the Court's opinion "we do not dictate
any particular allocation of water."" '7 This task was left for the Water Board.
IV.

The Aftermath of National Audubon
A.

The Supreme Court Decision: A Clever Catalyst for Compromise

The California Supreme Court did not mandate any particular water
allocations in its National Audubon decision. The Court declared that the mere
clarification of water rights in California was the first move forward in the
ultimate solution for the Mono Basin dispute." 8 Resolving the legal issues was
the Court's.primary objective." 9 The Court hoped "by integrating these two
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doctrines.., lit would I clear away the legal barriers which have so far prevented
either the Water Board or the courts from taking a new and objective look at the
water resources of the Mono Basin."'6
Thus, the Court communicated to the parties involved that they had the
responsibility to seek creative and novel ways to solve the problem. The Court
essentially acknowledged that the parties with such important interests at
stake-on one hand the water supply for the City of Los Angeles, and on the
other, the aesthetic and ecological preservation of an important water
resource-were in the best position to come up with.a solution. Courts are illsuited by function, process, and expertise to achieve win-win compromises to
conflicts having important non-legal dimensions. Removal of the legal barriers
catalyzed the move from conflict to cooperation. Eventually, the parties reached
a cooperative solution to the problem, but not until the conflict persisted for ten
years after the National Audubon decision.
B.

Continuing Utigation: The Feeder Streams Litigation

Following the National Audubon decision, environmental groups pursued a
number of lawsuits with the dual purposes of water level and ecosystem
preservation. This time they used a strategy assisted by a natural phenomenon.
During wet winters in the 1980s, the dams overflowed and allowed previously
absent trout to enter the Mono Lake feeder streams. The trout became the
object of litigation to ensure continuing adequate water levels in the streams
and therefore reduced diversions.
The litigation was brought under provisions of the California Fish and
Game Code rather than the public trust doctrine. Section 5946 of the Fish and
Game Code states that no water appropriation permit or license can be issued
in either Mono or lnyo counties after September 8, 1953, unless the applicants
comply with Fish and Game Code § 5937, adopted by a 1937 statute. 61 Section
5937 requires dam operators to allow enough water to flow through, around, or
over the dam to maintain the fish below the dam.'62 Los Angeles commenced
diversions of water from the Mono Basin in 1941 under an earlier-issued permit.
However, DWP did not obtain licenses for the diversion facilities until 1974. 63
Between 1984 and 1986, environmental groups, including the Mono Lake
Committee, the National Audubon Society, and Califomia Trout, lnc, filed four
lawsuits under Sections 5937 and 5946 concerning the instream flows of Rush, Lee
Vining, Walker, and Parker Creeks, which are four of the five Mono Lake tributaries.'6 4
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The plaintiffs contended that the Water Board, in issuing licenses to DWP in 1974,
violated State laws requiring maintenance of minimum flows to protect the fish
populations in the streams.
In 1984, the Mono County Superior Court issued a temporary restraining
order requiring DWP to release 9 cubic feet per second (cfs) of water into Rush
Creek, which became a preliminary injunction in 1985. In 1986, the Court issued
a temporary restraining order compelling the release of 10 cfs into Lee Vining
Creek, which was modified to become a 1987 preliminary injunction compelling
a release of about 4 cfs.
In one of the lawsuits, Caifornia Trout, Inc. v. SuperiorCourt (hereinafter "California
Trout 1",)161 the Sacramento County Superior Court denied the environmental groups'
petitions for writs of mandate to compel the Water Board to rescind DWP's licenses
under the Fish and Game Code provisions."6 The California Court of Appeal, Third
District, reversed the trial court.'67 The appellate court held that the Water Board was
required to apply Sections 5937 and 5946 and, in so doing, modify DWP's licenses to
ensure minimum stream flows to support fish populations.'" The court rejected
arguments that DWP had vested water rights to which the Fish and Game Code
provisions had been improperly9 applied retroactively and that fishery uses could not
6
be favored over domestic uses.1

On remand, the Superior Court mandated that DWP stabilize stream flows to
maintain the fisheries, but allowed the Water Board three years to comply until it
had completed environmental studies. The Superior Court denied interim relief to
the environmentalists. On appeal ("California Trout 11")
7, the Califomia Court of
Appeal again reversed the trial court, directed the court to set interim flow releases
for the four streams tributary to Mono Lake, and directed the Water Board to impose
immediate conditions on DWP's licenses to comply with California Trout 1.171
In essence, the successful curtailment of diversions that resulted from this
litigation marked another shocking victory for the environmental groups.
Another victory helped to lessen the perceived strength of DWP's position.
Again, DWP's position had been created, at least in part, by the Water Board's
mistaken belief that it was powerless to limit the diversions.
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C.

Mono Lake Committee Activism and Endurance

The environmentalists' persistent activism and efforts at both public
education and problem solving were at least as critical to their success at saving
Mono Lake as their legal victories were. The Mono Lake Committee, under the
leadership of David Gaines, gradually came to exercise significant influence not only
over the use of water in the Mono Basin but also over water usage in Southem
California generally.' Gaines was pivotal in gaining state reserve and national forest
scenic area designation for the shore area surrounding Mono Lake in the early 1980s
and national recognition of the Los Angeles diversions.'73
The Committee achieved public recognition of the Mono Lake problem
primarily through the "Save Mono Lake" campaign. The campaign generated
thousands of bumper stickers with the slogans "Save Mono Lake," "Long Live
Mono Lake," "I Save Water For Mono Lake," "Restore Mono Lake," and "Mono
Lake: It's For the Birds."' 74 This public education campaign included an
information center and. bookstore in Lee Vining, California, interpretive tours at
Mono Lake, publications and a website, information presentations and slide
shows for various groups, and both at-school and outdoor informational
programs for Los Angeles area youth and children. 7 '
The public education campaign generated an unexpected "rise of the
environmental ethic and the force with which that ethic would be brought to bear."' 76
The Committee gained more than 20,000 members.'
Significantly, the public
education campaign had a substantial impact on the attitudes of Southern California
residents, the consumers of water diverted from the Mono Lake tributaries.
Tragically, in January 1988, both Gaines and his assistant were killed in a car
accident five years after the California Supreme Court decision in National Audubon. "'
His successor, Martha Davis-a Stanford graduate with a master's degree in forest
science from Yale-proved to be a major force, continuing the work of the
Committee's founder.'79 The Committee devoted attention not only to saving Mono
Lake but also to seeking creative solutions to the growing demand for water in
Southern California, out of concern that reduced diversions from Mono Lake merely
would be replaced by harmful diversions from another equally important water basin.
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At first, DWP tried to ignore the Mono Lake Committee with its highly
educated leaders, graduate students, summer interns, and other activists.' 8 just
a month before Gaines' death, in December 1987, DWP finally agreed to work
with the Mono Lake Committee to reach a long-term preservation solution.'8'
Beginning in 1989, city officials publicly began to acknowledge the group's
strength and victories.182 DWP's assistant general manager at that time, Duane
Georgeson, said "they have been a well-organized, effective group' for a long
time... [tlhey've done a pretty good job mobilizing public opinion. 83
D.

Refraning and Negotiation

For a long time, "DWP portrayed the fight as 'win-lose'-if Mono Lake
won, L.A. would lose.'18 4 In May 1991 Martha Davis, executive director of the
Mono Lake Committee, perceived that this attitude was changing. She believed
a compromise could be reached that would make certain Los Angeles receives
water it requires, while Mono Lake is preserved.' 8' The Mono Lake Committee
wisely acknowledged early in the conflict that it would not be effective to argue
whether Los Angeles had the rights to the water.'8 The Committee instead
focused on ways to achieve Mono Lake protection and protection of other water
sources, while finding ways to address Southern California's water needs.' 7
The previously discussed factors had a significant impact in moving the
parties toward cooperation because they each chipped away at the strength of
DWP's position. DWP previously seemed to have a stranglehold on the water
rights, with other interested parties left without legal recourse. DWP appeared to
have underestimated the potential for a loss in National Audubon on the issue of
whether the public trust doctrine applies to "well-settled" appropriative rights or
the likelihood that the California Supreme Court would fashion a decision
requiring negotiation and compromise. According to a well-informed Mono
Basin water controversy follower, the National Audubon decision shocked many
88
people including lawyers and water management personnel.
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DWP also failed to consider that the environmentalists would pursue
other creative avenues of litigation-the feeder stream cases. Not only did the
environmentalists pursue creative legal claims, but their claims were effective.
The sheer activism and endurance by the Mono Lake Committee also played a
significant role. Perhaps most surprising of all, the environmentalists greatly
influenced public opinion, including the attitudes of DWP's customer, towards
protecting Mono Lake.
A significant factor in motivating Los Angeles to consider conservation
measures was a drought beginning in 1986. 89 Another important factor in
moving the parties toward cooperation was 1989 state legislation that
conditionally set aside sixty million dollars to help pay for a substitute supply of
water for Los Angeles. 9 ° The legislation provided an incentive for cooperation.
To qualify for the funds, Los Angeles was required to reach agreement with the
Mono Lake Committee concerning the source of the substitute water.'91 The
legislation reflected the environmentalists' concerns about protecting other
watersheds from excessive diversions that might substitute for the reductions in
diversions from Mono Lake's tributaries. Furthermore, in 1992, Congress
authorized federal funds for reclamation
of 120,000 acre-feet of water to offset
92
reduced diversions from Mono Lake.1
The available funding did not bring the parties into agreement quickly,
however. The parties did not reach agreement until four years after the
legislation was enacted. California Assemblyman Phillip lsenberg, a Democrat
from Sacramento who co-authored the legislation, was quoted as saying
"IfIrankly, I never expected it to take so long to give away this money."' 93 To help
make the compromise happen, Governor Pete Wilson promised that the State of
California would match
twenty million dollars in funds beginning in the
94
1994-1995 fiscal year.

Cooperation finally occurred after Los Angeles Councilwoman Ruth
Galanter brokered the negotiations. 9 Ms. Galanter described the negotiations
as overcoming paranoia by two groups that distrusted and were openly hostile
toward one another.96 Additionally, Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan
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replaced four DWP commissioners with new appointees that were eager to leave
the past behind and cooperate."' Thus, in addition to the other previously
discussed factors, the passage of time and new faces at the negotiation table
were important to a resolution of the conflict.
In December 1993, the parties finally reached agreement. Martha Davis, the
Executive Director of the Mono Lake Committee called the agreement "the political
equivalent of the Camp David accord.' 98 The City of Los Angeles agreed to erect a
fifty million dollar water reclamation plant, eliminating the need for almost one-half
of the water normally withdrawn from the Mono Lake feeder streams. 99 This
agreement marked the first time that Los Angeles voluntarily relinquished any of its
water rights in favor of an alternate source."' In 1997, the representatives of both
DWP and the National Audubon Society signed a memorandum agreement for the
construction of the water reclamation plant in the San Femando Valley with an

eventual capacity to recycle 35,000 acre-feet of water.20
E.

Water Board Decision 1631 (1994)

The agreement reached by DWP and the environmentalists facilitated a
decision by the Water Board concerning the amount of water that DWP is
entitled to divert from the Mono Basin. The decision was made eleven years
after the California Supreme Court directed the Board to balance the public
trust with DWP's water rights and determine the diversions permitted. Following
forty-four days of hearings before the Water Board, the Board-by unanimous
vote-required Los Angeles to significantly reduce diversions from the Mono
Basin to no more than 12,000 acre-feet per year, graduated over time, until the
Mono Lake water level rises sixteen feet. 202 The Water Board decision0 3 allows
an increase in diversions to 25,000 acre-feet per year once the water level rises
by sixteen feet- a level that both sides predict will take between twenty-five and
thirty years to occur.204
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The Water Board established minimum flow rates for each feeder stream
for various yearly precipitation scenarios.2"' The Water Board relied primarily on
California Department of Fish and Game recommendations for the flow rates.2
The Water Board concluded that these feeder stream flows would cause Mono
Lake to rise to roughly 6,390 feet. However, to comply with federal air quality
standards, the Water Board set the required average lake level at 6,392 feet.0 7 to
reduce the blowing of particulates .2" This level was also chosen to protect
public trust resources including the California gull and other migratory birds'
nesting habitats, brine shrimp productivity, public access to the lake's tufta
towers, compliance with water quality standards, and enhancement of the
aesthetic values of the lake.2' The graduated diversion system was created to
meet the average lake level.
Furthermore, the Water Board supplemented Decision 1631 with an order
in 1998 establishing stream and waterfowl habitat restoration plans pursuant to
the parties' agreement. 2' This 1998 order is designed to effectuate Decision
1631 with ecosystem restoration and monitoring measures, and effectively ends
the courts' jurisdiction over the Mono Lake controversy.
Decision 1631 ended the fifteen-year battle the environmental groups
launched to stop the negative impacts on Mono Lake when DWP indicated it would
not appeal the Water Board's decision. 21' Both the National Audubon Society and
the Mono Lake Committee were extremely pleased by the Water Board's decision.
The National Audubon Society described the decision as "an environmental victory
of lifetime proportions" 212 and the Mono Lake Committee described it as "the
breakthrough environmental decision on water," protecting Mono Lake
and
23
prompting Los Angeles to find local sources to replace the distant diversions. 1
F.

Reclamation and Conservation Efforts

An important aspect of the compromise between DWP and the
environmentalists was a major reclamation and conservation program. The program is
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designed to replace reduced diversions from Mono Lake with reduced demand for
water appropriations, instead of diversions from other water bodies that would harm
the ecosystems and public trust values associated with those water bodies.
In June 1990, the Los Angeles City Council approved a recycling goal of forty
percent of Los Angeles' wastewater by 20 10.2 4 The East Valley Water Recycling
Project will begin distributing water to spreading grounds in Los Angeles which will
in turn, within five years, pass through into groundwater basins in the city. 2' This is
DWP's biggest water recycling project and will eventually meet almost half of Los
Angeles' 2010 recycling goal.2 ' An added benefit to this project is that it will also
serve irrigation and industrial customers that lie along the route of the Recycling
Project pipeline. 27" According to the Mono Lake Committee, the capacity to recycle
35,000 acre-feet of water per year is enough to support 200,000 families per year,
helping to offset some of the 78,000 acre-feet reduction in Mono Lake diversions
required by the Water Board2
Recent conservation, including the efforts by Los Angeles residents, have
allowed the existing Los Angeles water supply stretch further. In fact, even
though an additional one million people moved into Los Angeles between 1975
and 1995, the City's water usage did not change. 29 Other projects including the
West Basin and East Valley reclamation facilities, other reclamation sources,
and other conservation efforts are expected to recycle 141,250 acre-feet per
year. 221 In addition, the California Urban Water Conservation Council has
developed a list of water conservation "Best Management Practices" expected to
save 700,000 acre-feet of water annually in Southern California. 2
DWP has undertaken numerous other aggressive conservation strategies. To
encourage conservation, Los Angeles' water rates are about twenty percent higher
during the summer--a high water use season.222 DWP also provides Los Angeles
residents with water conservation tools. For example, a Los Angeles resident may
request free water conservation kits that include low-flow showerheads, water
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displacement bags for toilets, and dye tablets to help detect water leaks.223 A Los
Angeles resident may also receive up to one hundred fifty dollars in rebates from
DWP for purchasing and installing a high-efficiency washing machine. 224 Similarly,
DWP's Ultra-Low-Flush toilet rebate program provide a Los Angeles resident up to
one hundred dollars for replacing a regular toilet.225
The most important facet of these reclamation and conservation programs
is that the programs do not draw new water from other sources. The programs
reuse, recycle, and conserve used water. This is a major achievement for the
environmentalists. Not only did they achieve preservation of the aesthetic and
ecological values of Mono Lake, but the City of Los Angeles did not turn to and
damage another water source in the State.
G.

Progress

Although it is too soon to make a definitive evaluation of the Mono Lake
agreement's effectiveness, there are promising developments in three areas that suggest
the outcome of this conflict has had benefits. First, the level of Mono Lake has risen. As
of October 1,2001, Mono Lake was at 6,382.8 feet above sea level, which was a gain of 8.2
feet since the Water Board's Decision 1631 in 1994.226 Although the lake level
experienced some decreases in 2000 and 2001 despite near normal runoffs, higher than
normal runoff between 1995 and 1999 has put the lake level ahead of its schedule under
normal runoff conditions to reach the target of 6,391 feet by 2021 (26 years after Decision
1631).227 Furthermore, there have been increases in water flows in the four creeks that
were subject to the litigation, judicial decisions, and Water Board orders, and efforts are
underway to restore stream channels and flows, and riparian habitats and ecosystems,
despite the presence of damage from over forty years of excessive diversions.228
Second, Southern Califomians have changed their water usage practices. The
conservation and reclamation programs described above have had an impact. In 1998,
the Metropolitan Water District (MWD) service area, which covers a significant portion
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of Southern California including Los Angeles (DWP), used the same amount of water
as it had in 1983, fifteen years earlier, despite a population growth of about 30
percent.229 Indeed, MWD's water sales dropped from 2.6 million acre-feet of water in
1990 to 1.5 million acre-feet of water in 1993.230 Perhaps even more significantly, MWD
and DWP are engaged in an effort to stabilize their supplies of water and become
drought-resistant by pursuing five strategies: 1)conservation, which reduced the usage
of water per person or per unit of economic activity; 2) reclamation, which reuses
water; 3) storage, which places water in reservoirs when it is readily available for use
when it is more scarce; 4) groundwater replenishment and storage programs; and 5)
purchases of available water supplies in water markets.2 1' It would appear that
Southern California water agencies are responding to the potential uncertainty to
water supplies posed not only by drought but also by litigation and judicial and
administrative decisions limiting water rights to protect the environment. The Mono
Lake conflict has contributed to a shift in Southern California water policy from rightsbased approaches to management-based approaches.
Third, the Mono Lake Committee and other environmental groups have
become active in other water law and policy issues. For example, the Committee
works with Los Angeles. area government and citizen groups on conservation
ideas and policies as part of the Los Angeles Conservation Council. The
Committee also has promoted state bonds for parks and water, become
involved in negotiations over the use and quality of water in the San Francisco
Bay Delta, and lobbied for federal ultra-low flush toilet regulations.232
V.

Making the Public Trust Doctrine Effective: The Real Public Trust

Commentators have described the public trust doctrine as a powerful and
effective constraint on degradation of natural resources and their associated
ecosystems.233 In particular, National Audubon has been regarded as one of the most
important environmental law cases of the twentieth century because the California
Supreme Court applied a common law principle as an inherent, albeit undelineated,
limit on property rights that harm the environment.' Other commentators have
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questioned the effectiveness of the public trust doctrine and other common law
principles to achieve environmental protection or resolve conflicts between the
economically productive use of natural resources and the protection of their
"
ecological, aesthetic, and other non-commercial values.23
' These commentators
favor either regulation or marketforces, instead of judicial oversight.
As this case study demonstrates, questions about the effectiveness of
judicial decisions applying the public trust doctrine involve greater subtlety and
nuance than might first appear. We might refer to the impact of judicial
23
decisions and legal doctrine as "bounded effectiveness.""
In general, judicial
decisions like National Audubon and doctrinal rules about the integration of the
public trust doctrine with prior appropriation water rights systems are
necessary, but not sufficient, to achieve the values behind the public trust. Nonlitigation strategies are required to make the public trust effective in practice.
This "bounded effectiveness" is evident in both the Mono Lake litigation itself
and the aftermath of National Audubon. In National Audubon, the California Supreme
Court accomplished only three things.23 First, the Court resolved the legal issues
presented to it, namely whether the public trust doctrine requires the elimination of
recognized appropriative water rights that adversely affect navigable waters and if so,
to what extent, and also whether the plaintiffs in the case had exhausted their
administrative remedies or were required to do so. Second, the Court established both
the legal authority and the legal duty of the Water Board to balance public trust values
with appropriative water rights in all circumstances in which both legal interests might
be implicated, as well as the power of the courts to enforce this obligation in future
cases. Third, the Court issued a writ of mandate compelling the Water Board to
redetermine DWP's entitlements to water diversions by considering and balancing
both the public trust doctrine and DWP's previously authorized water rights.
The National Audubon Court did not, however, establish the amount of water that
DWP was entitled to divert from Mono Lake's tributaries. The Court did not resolve the
conflict between Los Angeles and environmentalists, which persisted for ten years
after the landmark decision was handed down. The Court did not identify any of the
specific features of the compromise that ultimately solved the Mono Lake problem,
like reclamation and conservation, public education, and state funding. Furthermore,
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with respect to future conflicts between public trust values and appropriative water
rights in other water systems, the Court did not establish bright-line rules for either
courts or the Water Board to apply.238 Nor did the Court give either environmentalists
or water appropriators much basis for evaluating the likelihood of winning or losing in
subsequent public trust litigation. In short, the Court articulated only general
principles, the specific meaning, content, and effectiveness of which would be
determined in other forums and by non-judicial actors.
We contend, therefore, that the "real" public trust doctrine is defined by
parties' and decision makers' non-litigation actions in light of judicially-determined
general principles. If the parties to the Mono Lake dispute had not reached an
acceptable solution, the public trust doctrine might have come to mean very little in
the context of water rights. Of course, the environmental groups could have
persisted with litigation to enforce the NationalAudubon decision and force the Water
Board to reduce DWP's legally permitted diversions. However, during continued
conflict and non-resolution, further harm to the lake could have occurred while
diversions continued. In addition, DWP could have found a replacement source of
water to appropriate from another watershed, causing harm to bodies of water and
their related ecosystems elsewhere. Further public trust litigation might have been
needed to prevent such a replacement strategy or, more likely, to stop such
replacement diversions after enough evidence of their harm could be gathered.
Perhaps more seriously, a completely rights-based "solution" limiting DWP's
rights to water appropriations generally in favor of the public trust might have
generated political forces and public pressures that would have weakened the public
trust doctrine altogether. 239 It is not inconceivable that a large, thirsty Southern
California electorate could have used the initiative process to pass a constitutional
amendment limiting the public trust doctrine's applicability to water rights.24°
Likewise, courts and the Water Board might have weakened the application of the
public trust doctrine to water rights in subsequent cases if the early disputes had
not reached pragmatic solutions acceptable to the primary parties in interest.
We do not contend that either the public trust doctrine as a legal theory or,
litigation under the public trust doctrine is unimportant or unnecessary. Both the
public trust litigation and the feeder stream litigation under the California Fish and
Game Code played four critical roles. First, DWP's losses upset its expectations that it
had the right to use water without limits, therefore eventually bringing DWP to the
bargaining table with the environmentalists. Second, the outcomes in both sets of
cases shifted the relative bargaining power of the two parties towards greater powerboth legally and psychologically-for the environmentalists than they had prior to the
decisions. Third, the Water Board, for all practical purposes, "gained" authority and
duty to consider environmental factors and public trust values in evaluating new and
existing water rights generally, because the Court disabused the Board of its
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assumption that it had no such authority or duty.24 ' Finally, other water users are likely

to reevaluate their positions and rethink conflicts and potential conflicts they may
have with environmental interests over minimum instream flows, in light of the
outcomes of National Audubon and the feeder stream litigation.242 In short, it was
essential to have a judicial decision on the applicability of the public trust doctrine to
water rights in order to have an "aftermath" to effectuate the doctrine.
Nonetheless, several non-litigation elements of the aftermath of National
Audubon turned what could have been a doctrinally astonishing but practically
ineffective judicial decision into effective protection for the Mono Lake
ecosystem, as well as a model for subsequent conflicts between the public trust
and appropriative rights. One of these elements was the ultimate choice by both
sides to reframe the conflict.243 The parties in itially appeared to perceive their
dispute as a legal conflict over rights. They made substantial progress towards
an efficient and effective solution when both sides perceived the conflict as a
multi-faceted problem to be solved cooperatively, or at least by negotiation.
A closely related element was the creative pursuit of practical and feasible
solutions that would maximize both sides' interests. 4 The environmentalists defined
their interests as not just stopping or reducing diversions from Mono Lake's
tributaries. Instead, they understood that their interests encompassed the protection
of all water sources that support ecosystems, and that a Mono Lake victory at the
expense of another watershed would have meant failure. Likewise, the
environmentalists insightfully perceived that DWP's real interests revolved around an
adequate, feasible, and reliable supply of water for its rapidly growing consumers. The
environmentalists knew that DWP could accept reduced diversions if its interests
could be met in other ways. The combination of conservation and reclamation
programs enabled by state funding met the parties' primary interests. The solution
allowed for reduced diversions from Mono Lake's tributaries without replacing that
water with diversions from another watershed. It did so by enhancing supply from
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existing sources and stabilizing water supplies over time, and by reducing demand
without reducing the urban growth and economic activity of Southem California.
An important factor in reaching agreement on this solution was public
education and advocacy. Water disputes are highly political. Economic forces shape
political forces, which in tum shape legal doctrine based on provisions of a state
constitution amendable by the voters. Los Angeles officials needed clear evidence of
public support for saving Mono Lake at the cost of DWP's water rights.
Conservation-based solutions would work only if consumers accepted them. In this
political-economy context, the role of the public education campaign to "save Mono
Lake" cannot be underestimated. Some elements of the public education and
advocacy campaign involved information about Mono Lake's valuable ecosystem
and the harms caused by excessive water diversions. Other elements, especially the
bumper stickers and the T-shirts, focused on building public support and
enthusiasm, without detailed information. Both elements were critical to the
effective application of public trust principles to the Mono Lake conflict.
A final factor important to the parties' agreement was that of political
leadership. State and federal leaders committed funding that served as both an
incentive and a facilitator of a negotiated solution. Local officials replaced
uncooperative DWP officials with leaders committed to cooperation and
problem-solving. At least one official mediated the dispute. These leaders'
investment of political capital and public funds in reaching a solution that
would maximize both parties' interests not only reflected the success of the
environmentalists' public education and advocacy campaign but also moved the
dispute past obstacles and delays to resolution.
VI.

Conclusion

The Mono Lake conflict established the applicability of the public trust doctrine
to appropriative water rights. The California Supreme Court's decision in National
Audubon Society .v. Superior Court gave judicial recognition to the public trust doctrine's
potential limits on prior appropriation rights, and cleverly imposed on the Water
Board the obligation to balance the two doctrines. The decision implicitly recognized
that the real effectiveness of the doctrine could not be judicially mandated, but instead
depended on the post-litigation actions of the parties. In the aftermath of National
Audubon, both environmentalists and water appropriators moved towards practical
and ultimately cooperative solutions of reduced diversions, publicly funded
reclamation projects, and a broad conservation program. These solutions, arguably
"win-win" in that they met the primary interests of both parties, emerged from a mix of
litigation, refraining the conflict as a multi-faceted problem requiring solution,
pragmatic assessment of the parties' respective interests, creative and practical ideas,
public education and advocacy, and political leadership. The "real" public trust
doctrine exists as much in the post-litigation interactions of parties that resolve
conflicts and give effect to public trust values as it does in judicial decisions describing
and announcing the doctrine's applicability.

